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Abstract
Since the late 1970s the problem of urban education has been cast as
partially a problem of governance and authority structures.  This focus
mirrors a larger preoccupation by educational reformers with
democratizing the decision-making process in public schools, a
preoccupation that is evident not only in this country but also many
nations throughout the world. Borrowing from the private sector, the
underlying assumption behind decentralization is that educational
improvement is only possible if those closest to the point at which
decision are enacted become the architects of these decisions.  Thus,
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school-based management or participatory decision-making is viewed as
a means to formally incorporate the voices of parents, teachers and the
community in the management of their schools. This paper discusses the
findings of a recently conducted study on school-based management in
thirty of New Jersey's poorest districts (referred to as the Abbott
Districts).  These districts have begun a process of complex reform after
the State's Supreme Court ruled that the state had failed to
constitutionally provide a thorough and efficient education for its poorest
students by the absence of parity funding.  Populated by primarily black
and Hispanic students, and representing most of the larger urban
communities in the state, students in these districts exhibit performance
levels significantly below that of the state average.  The results of the
study indicate that (1) genuine autonomy has been usurped by an
intensification in state power and authority, (ii) state elites have provided
little opportunity for districts and SBM teams to build capacity; (iii) the
level of democratization or opening-up of decision making to local
community members has been minimal as the teams become teacher
dominated; and  (iv) in the absence of clear guidelines from the State,
conflict over the appropriate role of SBM members, principals, central
office staff and local school boards has emerged. The paper on the basis
of these findings explores some policy options that need to be considered
both at the state and local levels as school communities move toward
more decentralized governance structures.
  
Introduction
Education remains one of the primary means through which social mobility is attained. 
Yet, the many discourses on the state of educational institutions suggest institutions that
are imperiled for a variety of reasons.  This crisis in public education is viewed as more
pronounced in communities peopled by the poor of Latino and African- American
descents than in white affluent communities.  While the problems of these educational
systems have been framed in many different ways, one argument that has been
consistently forwarded centers on the endemic paralysis of their central bureaucratic
structures in responding to efforts of change.   Consequently, a popular policy solution
has focused on the devolution of power and authority from these central bureaucracies to
less formal and rigid structures i.e. schools.  However, the history of the decentralization
movement reveals noticeable ideological shifts behind the purpose of school-based
management (SBM).
During the sixties, attempts were made to increase the level of participation in
decision-making through the formal incorporation of various subgroups.  Concerned with
such issues as granting greater power and authority to local communities, diffusing state
authority and increasing organizational efficiency, the decentralization movements of this
era saw the devolution of authority as a means of meeting political and administrative
ends (David, 1989; Wohlstetter & Mohrman, 1996).  The eighties however, witnessed a
change in the purposive intent behind decentralization. This change resulted from the
pervasive influence of the reform movements that dominated the educational landscape
of this period. During the eighties, there was a broad call for the implementation of
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comprehensive educational changes - changes that addressed professional development
and instruction, the replacement of bureaucratic regulations with professional
responsibility and accountability, and the development of high standards for teachers as
well as students (David, 1989).   The focus of school-based management thus became
inextricably interwoven with concerns about student achievement. 
The growing popularity of school-based management as a reform strategy is evidenced by
the fact that in 1993 over 44 states practiced some form of decentralized governance
(Herman & Herman, 1993). Within the broader global context, decentralization became
an integral component of the reform movements in countries such as New Zealand,
Canada, Britain, Spain, and Wales (Hanson & Ulrich, 1994; Leithwood & Menzies,
1998).  Ironically, at the same time that increasing numbers of school districts, states, and
nations were adopting decentralization policies in the hope of bringing about
improvement in student achievement, the evidence suggested that school-based
management was less powerful a source of school improvement than its advocates
believed.  Indeed, the evidence continues to show that the impact of school-based
management is more apparent in the areas of governance and organizational structures
than in changed classroom practices and improved student achievement (Summers &
Johnson, 1991; Wohlstetter & Mohrman 1996).
Notwithstanding this trend, several arguments have been advanced by proponents of
decentralization in support of the superiority of this form of governance arrangement over
centralized structures (Murphy, 1991).  First,  it is argued that decentralization gives
communities, parents and teachers a stake in local educational decision-making.  Second,
decentralization is seen to contribute to the evolution of greater levels of professional
commitment by allowing teachers to exercise a voice in decision-making.  Third, the
suggestion is proffered that the creation of decisions at levels that are closest to students,
results in better outcomes, as those making the decisions are more acutely aware of the
needs of these students.  Fourth, decentralization is viewed as a mechanism that has the
potential to promote greater efficiency in the utilization and expenditure of resources.
This is achieved, since the decisions are being made by those closest to the point where
services are being delivered, thereby resulting in a greater match of services to needs.
Fifth, since bureaucracies are perceived to be ineffective in meeting the needs of students,
decentralized structures are considered to have the potential to be more responsive to
student needs than are bureaucratic organizational forms.
The Theoretical Underpinnings of School-Based Management
The above arguments on the advantages of this form of school governance reveal some
important theoretical assumptions. Undoubtedly, the notion of decentralization in
educational decision-making and governance issues appeals to the social democratic
principles of egalitarianism whereby local communities acquire a voice in institutional
building and operation (Seddon, Angus & Poole, 1990).  If this principle is actualized
through the creation of democratic decision-making structures, a significant shift in the
realignment of power relationships can be expected to occur.  Specifically, grass root
groups functioning in some combination with school-based leadership ideally would
replace the dominance enjoyed by educational bureaucratic elites in local school
governance matters. Devolution of authority thus enables the education constituency to
become more inclusive and less narrowly restricted to technocrats. By accomplishing
this, the balance of power between educational elites on the one hand, and local
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community and school-based actors on the other, is redistributed to the advantage of the
latter group (Seddon, Angus & Poole, 1990). 
Theoretically, this redistribution of power corresponds to a re-conceptualization of the
organizational unit deemed to be most important administratively for the improvement of
learning. Under the old governance model, central office units were considered to have
the administrative responsibility for ensuring that the conditions needed to promote
learning were in place. With decentralization, the school as a subunit now assumes this
role.
Organizational and economic arguments have also played a role in framing some of the
assumptions on which the concept of decentralization of authority structures in
educational settings is grounded.  Some organizational theorists argue that a decentralized
environment is optimal for efficiency in operations, since employees who are empowered
to make decisions have more control over their work and hence become more
accountable for decisions (Murphy, 1991).  The premise of these arguments is that by
flattening the decision-making process, and bringing it closer to the site where client
needs are met, the effectiveness of the organization is improved, as employees based on
their knowledge and interactions with clients can reshape their products and services
based on an understanding of client needs.
Miron (1996) posits to the contrary however, that the incorporation of corporate
principles of decentralization as reflected in the ideology of shared decision- making
ought to be approached with caution by educators.  According to Miron, corporate
downsizing and decentralization of decision-making represented a strategic response by
capital to the global fiscal crisis.  However, the relative complexity of schools'
institutional processes when compared to those in the corporate world implies that the
importation of the ‘logic of capital' into educational institutions can create a set of
discursive practices, as well as mask some of the macrostructural and micropolitical
processes that are in play.    
In a similar vein, Ball and Smyth have advanced a critical political-economic perspective
on school-based management (Ball, 1993; Smyth, 1993).  Both have advanced the notion
that decentralization ought to be understood within the context of resource availability,
social responsibility, and accountability.  From these writers' perspectives, the social
democratic principles on which decentralization is premised, and which appear appealing
to constituencies whose voices have been rendered mute by educational elites, belie some
of the hidden motivation behind those at state and governmental levels who push this
form of governance.  Specifically, the argument is posited that the devolution of authority
from central sources, especially at the state level, serves to legitimize state agencies in
many ways.   First, it gives the appearance that these agencies are sensitive to local
needs.  Second, by shifting decision-making responsibilities to the schools, these agencies
can distance themselves from failed policies by blaming schools for poor management
and flawed decision-making.  This works in the favor of state elites by insulating them
from the consequences and contradictions that are generated by the formulation of poor
policies.
Moreover, both Ball and Smyth view the devolution of authority to local schools as
placing unfair burdens on schools in instances of resource scarcity.  Under these
conditions, schools are placed in the unenviable position of having to make decisions on
how to distribute scarce resources.   However, in doing so, decentralization serves an
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important conflict management function. Welier's refinement of the latent functions
inhering in decentralization amplifies this underlying thesis of the political-economy
perspective (Weiler, 1990). Weiler argues that decentralization has two latent functions:
one that serves to legitimize certain socio-political arrangements, the other that allows for
the management of conflict.  Welier suggests that in policy contexts that are potentially
highly conflictual, such as education policy arenas, decentralization is politically
instrumental in helping to diffuse and manage conflict (See also Anderson & Dixon,
1993; Seddon, Angus & Poole, 1990).
The opposing theoretical arguments that have been presented in this paper imply that
decentralization is far more complex in its implications for schools than is popularly
understood.  Not-with-standing the problems that are associated with highly centralized
structures, the lack of any substantive data on the significant impact of decentralized
forms of educational governance on student achievement coupled with the problems that
have been encountered with the decentralization movement, suggest that closer
intellectual scrutiny of this concept is warranted (Anderson & Dixon, 1993; Gordon,
1992; Wohlstetter & Odden, 1992).
Purpose of Study
In 1998, in its culminating decision on the legal challenges to the State of New Jersey's
funding and educational policies with respect to the state's poorest districts, the New
Jersey Supreme Court ordered the implementation of a series of remedial measures aimed
at redressing the long standing disparities between poor and affluent school districts. The
decision referred to as Abbott V, sets out an ambitious agenda for reform that includes
changes in instructional programming through the adoption of whole school reform
models, expansion of early childhood programming and school- community social agency
linkages, as well as improvement in facilities (Abbott v. Burke, 1998).
According to regulations published by the New Jersey Department of Education, the
process of implementing the reforms ordered by the State's Supreme Court is to be guided
and led by teachers, parents, community and other school level staff through the formal
establishment of school management teams.  The regulation states that the purpose of
these teams is to “ensure participation of staff, parents and the community in school level
decision making and to develop a culture of cooperation, accountability and
commitment” (New Jersey Department of Education, 2000). To that end, the school
management teams are expected to guide and lead decisions on curricular, instructional,
personnel and budgetary matters.
This study in light of the preceding discussion on the unresolved theoretical and
empirical issues plaguing the notion of participatory decision-making, as well as New
Jersey's current policy guidelines governing the implementation of decentralization, raises
and seeks to answer the following questions with respect to school-based management in
the state's thirty poorest districts. First, what is the level of democratization that has
occurred in these systems? This question is answered through the posing of two related
concerns; the extent to which participation in decision-making reflects the major
constituencies that are intended to be on the school-management teams; and the degree to
which the process allows for the legitimate exercise of decision-making and authority.
Second, how has school-based management resulted in the successful devolution of
authority from centralized to decentralized localities?   The questions as they are posed,
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speak more to the issues of whether school-based management in its empirical form is
consonant with the assumptions of democratizing decision-making and hence the
social-democratic principle of egalitarianism and less with the effects of this form of
governance on student achievement. 
Method
Sample, Instrumentation and Data Collection
This study employs a mixed method research design. In April 2000, a questionnaire was
mailed to a randomly drawn sample of 140 elementary and middle schools' school
management teams.  Included in the survey were questions on team membership and
composition, the extent to which factors identified as germane to a team's ability to
function, such as training, and group coalescence influenced the legitimate exercise of
decision-making and the quality of support provided to the teams by the State Department
of Education. The survey elicited a response rate of 51%.  The school management teams
in the study represented four different cohorts of schools.   These cohorts correspond to
the timeframe in which the schools begun to implement whole school reform.
According to state regulations, schools had three years within which to begin their whole
school reform process.  Schools that started the process within the first year of the Court's
decision were referred to as Cohort 1 schools.  Similarly, schools that begun in the second
year were designated as Cohort 2 schools, schools during the middle of the second year
mid-year cohort schools, and during the third year, Cohort 3 schools. In our sample there
were 15 Cohort 1 school teams, 14 teams representing Cohort 2 schools, 6 teams from
mid-year Cohort schools, and 32 teams belonging to the third Cohort of schools.  Five
teams failed to identify their cohort status. Knowing the cohort status of the team is
important to the study at hand, since Cohort 1 school management teams- that is teams
belonging to schools who started the reform process a year after the Court rendered its
decision in 1998- had very little time to engage in quality planning. 
In addition to surveying the school management teams, two focus groups were held.  The
purpose of both focus groups was to gain an understanding of the processes that were
involved as authority got devolved from the central offices to the schools. The first focus
group was held with one central office representative from six school districts.  These
districts were chosen to reflect the racial composition of their student bodies, their
geographical locations in the State, their governance structures and when they were
classified as being an “Abbott District”. A second, less formally structured focus group
discussion was held with three superintendents in October of the same year.  These
superintendents were executive members of the statewide association of urban
superintendents.
Data Analysis
The data analysis involves the use of descriptive statistics and the statistical testing of
associational relationships, through the use of Chi Square and Analysis of Variance. 
Standardized residuals are reported when significant chi-square values were found. These
residuals allow us to identify the categories that are making a significant contribution to
the significant chi square value. Following Haberman's guideline, it was inferred that
where the standardized residual for a category is greater than 2, that category is strongly
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contributing to the significant chi square value (Haberman, 1984). Tukey post hoc testing
was done for those Anovas that were found to be significant.  Data gathered from the
focus groups data was subjected to a qualitative analysis. 
Findings
Degree of democratization of school-based management in the Abbott Districts
The New Jersey Department of Education guidelines state that the constituent groups that
must be represented on the school management teams are the building principals,
teachers, school-level support staff, parents, and community. The inclusion of students is
an optional requirement that is left to the discretion of the individual school. Groups or
individuals excluded from membership on a team are Board of Education members and
district employees who wish to serve in the capacity of a parent or community
representative.  According to the regulations, no one group can constitute 50 percent or
more of a team's total membership. Membership on a team is secured either through an
electoral process or by selection. The minimum number of years that a given member can
serve on a team is two, however, to ensure continuity in the event of an election or
selection, teams are allowed to stagger membership.
Murphy and Beck (1995) suggest that school based management typically assumes one of
three ideal forms; administrative control SBM (in this model the principal is the primary
decision maker), professional control (teachers are the primary decision makers) and
community/parent control (community members and parents comprise the major decision
making groups).  A fourth though less popular form is defined by Malen and Ogawa as
balanced control (Hanson & Ulrich, 1994; Malen & Ogawa, 1988). In this model an
attempt is made to establish a balance in decision-making among all stakeholders.   
Within the context of New Jersey, it is clear from the regulations that the Department of
Education promulgated that the attempt was to create a model that   approximated a
balanced control form of SBM.  The guidelines stated that the model to be adopted by
schools was one, which restricted the membership of any given stakeholder group to less
than 50 percent of the total membership. 
In actuality however, the findings from the present study indicate that SBM in New
Jersey is regressing towards a teacher-dominated form of SBM.  Of the sixty-nine teams
with valid responses on membership composition there were 17 teams in which the
teaching staff members represented more than 50% of the total membership and 13 teams
on which teachers made up half or 50% of the total membership. Thus, 43% of the teams
had at least half of their membership drawn from the teaching staff.   The dominance of
teachers on the school management teams cut across all cohorts. However,
proportionately more of the teams that were dominated by teachers were apt to be in
schools belonging to the first cohort.
With respect to representation from other stakeholders, while more than 90 percent of the
teams reported having at least one parent member, about 26 or approximately 38% of the
teams were at the time of the study without community representation. The twenty-six
teams reporting no community presence were proportionately distributed among the
various cohorts, although slightly more 43% or 6 out of the 14 second year cohort teams
in the study indicated that they had no community representation. On the other hand, only
7 teams had no in school-support staff representation. The data provided by the teams in
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the study reveals that most teams lacked student representation. Indeed 58 teams or
roughly 83% of the teams reported that there was no student membership.
In examining the degree of representation of the major constituencies on the teams, the
proportions for each group were calculated on the basis of the size of the team. On the
whole the median proportion for teachers was .47, for parents .22 and for community
members. 07. This implies that on half of the teams, teachers made up 47% or more of
the teams' membership, parents 22% and community stakeholders 7%. In-school support
staff, and school administrators constitute the remaining percentages.  Parent and
community groups thus accounted for about 29% of the total memberships, while
seventy-one percent of the teams' membership are drawn from school-based personnel.  
These findings suggest that the evolution of school-based management in the Abbott
districts has resulted in some instances, in structures, which deviate from what was
originally intended.  The balanced model, which was initially proposed, has not been the
dominant form.   
Whether or not, school-based management has successfully resulted in democratizing the
process of decision-making by incorporating the voices of key constituent groups remains
therefore questionable in light of these findings. Even in those instances in which parental
participation is secured, the dominance of school-based personnel has overshadowed the
voices of parents.  Kildow's case study of one team's functioning described how the
parent member frequently deferred to school-based members on all issues, and viewed
herself as less empowered to make decisions when compared to her school-based
counterparts (Kildow, 2000).  What these findings seem to suggest is that the ‘social
empowerment' of parents and communities that proponents of this form of governance
arrangement imply is attendant with participatory decision making has not occurred in the
New Jersey reforms.   
Barriers to the legitimate exercise of decision-making
The primary responsibility of the teams is to develop a plan that will guide the school's
implementation of its whole school reform model.   The teams are also responsible for
ensuring that their schools' curriculum and instruction are aligned to the New Jersey Core
Curriculum Content Standards. They are expected to engage in a needs assessment
process based on a review of student performance data on the statewide assessments and
on the basis of this review make recommendations for curricular and instructional
improvement.  Teams are also required to ensure that there is a program of professional
development for teachers in their individual schools linked to the school's whole school
reform model.  Each school is further responsible for the development of a technology
plan that is submitted to the Department of Education for approval.  In addition to these
responsibilities, the teams are also expected to ensure that there are programs and
activities that are linked to the cross content readiness standards in the core curriculum
standards, as well as develop a school based reward system for teachers, administrators
and parents who contribute to students successfully meeting these standards. Finally, the
teams based on a majority vote and with state department approval (through the School
Review and Improvement Team) are responsible for approving a school budget and may
recommend the appointment of a building principal, teaching staff member and
instructional aides.
The teams were asked to rate their abilities to function effectively along several
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operational dimensions that previous literature has identified to be important influences
on a team's capacity to successfully govern.  These dimensions include: clarity about
roles and responsibilities, membership commitment, understanding of a shared mission,
meeting schedules, attendance at meetings, effectiveness in communicating with the
larger school community and active as opposed to token participation in decision -
making.  Overall, the teams in the present study exhibited ambivalence in their evaluation
of their abilities to effectively govern. Teams were unanimous that their membership was
committed (86%) and that individual interests did not supersede the goals and mission of
their work (88%). Neither did teams report that conflict among members posed a barrier
to their ability to operate effectively (91%).  Indeed, ninety percent of the teams reported
that they were able to deal constructively with differences in opinions among themselves
when these differences arose. However, when an examination of the association between
team composition and the identification of barriers that impede the teams' abilities to
function effectively was done, some interesting findings emerged.
Teams that lacked community representation were more likely to indicate that individual
members' self interests took precedence over team matters.  A chi-square value of 8.75
was found to be significant, and the standardized residuals showed values of 2 or greater
for teams with poor community representation and the identification of problems with
individual self-interests.  Also, teams with no community representation indicated that
they were less likely to explore alternatives when making decisions than teams with
community representation (Chi-Square value of 8.118 was found to be significant at the
.044 level).  Again, standardized residuals were larger for these teams. On the other hand,
teams without community representation were less likely to report problems with
attendance at meetings than those with community representations (Chi Square value of
6.109 was found to be significant at the .05 level). The data also showed, that teams who
were cajoled to start their whole school reform process early, that is cohort 1 teams, were
significantly more likely to report problems with commitment, than those teams that
started the process much later (Chi Square value of 9.456 was found to be significant at
.045 level).
Table 1 
Association between Community Representation, 
Cohort Status and Factors Impacting a 
Team's Ability to Successfully Govern
 
Relationships χ2
Values
Significance 
Level
Community representation and Problems with individual
interests taking precedence over team matters
9.640 .01
Community representation and teams exploration of
alternatives when making decisions
8.118 .04
Community representation and attendance at meetings 6.109 .05
Cohort status and members commitment 9.456 .05
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Note: Total number of teams in analyses of community representation: 69; number of
teams in cohort analyses: 47.
With respect to role clarity, about one-third of the teams (31%) indicated that they were
unclear as to their roles and responsibilities. About the same percentage (33%) also
reported difficulties in communicating with their larger school communities.  Securing
adequate involvement from all potential constituent groups was raised as another problem
area affecting the ability to govern.  The experiences of teams in the larger school
districts are instructive on this issue.  According to these teams, the restrictive clause in
the regulations which preclude in-district employees from serving in the capacity of a
parent or community representative has hampered their abilities to recruit membership, as
a significant number of local residents have an employment status with the school system
 Lawler (1986) argued that legitimate participation has four requirements: knowledge and
skills, power, information, and rewards.  This framework has been used by Wohlestetter
et.al (1994) to explain variations in implementation and effects among SMTs operating in
different contexts.  In surveying the teams in the Abbott districts attention was paid to
three of these requirements, knowledge, skills and information.  Teams were asked to rate
on several scales their level of knowledge, previous experience and comfort in the ten
areas of their responsibilities.  It is reasonable to assume that the experiences, which
members on the school management teams bring to their new roles are likely to impact
qualitatively on the kinds of decisions that are made, and the teams comfort in doing so. 
Data on the number of team members who have had prior experiences in the 10 areas for
which they are responsible indicate that overall very few teams are composed of members
who have had prior involvement in any of these areas.  As can be seen in Table 2,
experience is weakest in the areas of school-based budgeting, technology planning,
school-based hiring decisions and developing reward systems.  Teams had
proportionately more members, who prior to joining the teams had some experience with
curriculum alignment and needs assessment.
Table 2
Percent of SMT Members with Prior Experience in 
Each Area of Teams' Responsibilities
Areas of Responsibility Percent of Members with Prior 
Experience
  Aligning Curriculum 41.7%
Conducting Needs Assessment 37.1%
Working on, or reviewing professional development 
programs
32.2%
Involved in developing school-based reward systems 30.0%
Involved in school-based hiring decisions 19.9%
Worked on developing a technology plan 16.8%
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Involved in school-based budgeting (zero-based) 
budgeting decisions
9.8%
Number of teams responding: 66
It is quite conceivable, that although Team members may lack the experience base for
making decisions, that nevertheless, they may have an informed knowledge base that can
be drawn upon in decision-making situations.  Each Team was asked to indicate the
degree of knowledge it possessed as an entity in each of the 10 areas of responsibility. 
These responses are summarized in Table 3.  About one third of the Teams felt that their
knowledge base on how to align curriculum, review test score data and determine
program and curricular needs on the basis of this review, as well as determine what
actions need to be taken to improve academic achievement in their schools was
substantive.  On the other hand, a significant proportion (over 75%) felt that they had
only some or no knowledge on how to 1) develop a professional development program
that is related to the implementation of the reform, (2) develop a technology plan, 3)
make decisions with regard to hiring school personnel, 4) develop a school-based budget
and 5) develop school based reward systems. Significant differences were found among
the cohorts.  Teams belonging to the first cohort were more likely to report lack of
knowledge with respect to developing school-based budgets than teams belonging to the
second, mid-year and third year cohorts.  Third-year cohort teams were also more likely
to report having less knowledge on creating professional development programs than the
second year cohorts.
Table 3
Areas of Responsibilities: Percent of Teams Reporting Minimal
Knowledge
Areas of SMT Responsibility
Percent of Teams Reporting 
Minimal Knowledge
Aligning Instruction to the Core Content Standard 55.4%
Deciding what actions needed to be taken on the basis 
of test score data
59.1%
Reviewing test score data as part of a needs assessment
process
Determining program needs on the basis of test score
reviews
62.1%
66.7%
Making curricular decisions on the basis of test score
data
66.7%
Developing school-based reward systems 75.8%
Developing a professional development program that is 
linked to the implementation of the reforms
79.4%
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Making school-based personnel decisions with respect 
to hiring
80.3%
Developing a technology plan 80.6%
Developing a school-based budget based on zero-based 
budgeting procedures
82.1%
Training is a critical component in the development of the knowledge and capacity of
teams to function effectively in making quality decisions. To that end, teams were asked
to rate the adequacy of training they received around the major substantive areas for
which they have responsibilities.  Twenty-three teams reported that they received no
training around any of the areas for which were given responsibility.  Overall, the teams
who provided feedback, were more favorable in their ratings of the training received in
areas related to curriculum, test score analysis and school-based professional
development, than they were in their evaluation of the training provided around
school-based hiring decisions and developing school-based reward systems (see  Table
4). 
Table 4
Percent of Teams Rating Training Received to be at Least Adequate
        Area of Training Support Percent of Teams Rating Training 
to be at
Least Adequate
Roles and responsibilities of the teams 59.0%
Developing acceptable standards for professional
development
56.8%
Curriculum Alignment 53.2%
Use of test scores for decision-making 51.1%
Analysis of test scores 50.0%
Technology planning 38.9%
Developing school-based reward systems 28.6%
Hiring procedures for school-based personnel 24.5%
Developing school-based budgets 21.1%
Number of teams responding:  47
Given the fact that teams lack the knowledge and experience to adequately fulfill their
responsibilities, and given the unevenness in their satisfaction with the training that they
have received, how comfortable are the teams in making the decisions that are expected
of them?   Data provided by the teams in the survey indicate that teams feel more
comfortable in making decisions related to curricular and instructional issues than they do
in making decisions that involve technology, school-based budgets, school hiring
decisions and reward structures.  For example, more than sixty percent of the teams
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reported that they are uncomfortable in creating rewards for teachers, and more than 80%
indicate that they would be similarly uncomfortable in determining rewards for their
building administrators.  Forty-percent of the teams indicated that they would not be
comfortable in making decisions involving the hiring of a principal and a similar percent
44% expressed discomfort in making teaching appointments.
In some of these decisions making areas teams are required to vote on whether or not they
wish to have input.  At the time of the survey, only 21% of the teams had voted to
provide input into the hiring of their building principal and 26 % for input into the
appointment of instructional aides.  Data culled from the focus group discussion
reinforced the notions that some teams are reluctant to get involved in hiring and
budgeting decisions.  According to the central office administrators in the focus group,
while some teams initially wanted to select personnel for their buildings, they
experienced discomfort when the process of selection begun, especially in those instances
when they had to make decisions about staff on their own level.  These results parallel
similar findings reported by Jones') study of teacher decision-making preferences in
Texas (Jones, 1997).  Jones found that teachers expressed a desire and were more
involved in areas concerning curriculum/instruction and student services than staff,
personnel and budget management.
Decentralization provides the impetus for the creation of a new institutional culture
within schools.  It also presupposes that some socialization occurs whereby all actors are
socialized to their new roles and responsibilities.  However, our discussion so far
suggests that the exercise of legitimate decision-making has been constrained by the
teams' inexperience, uneven knowledge base, and the absence of adequate training to
build capacity.
Devolving power from central to decentralized structures: Decreasing autonomy or
increasing centralization?
The New Jersey Department of Education has created a structure, the School Review and
Improvement Team (SRI) that ostensibly functions in the capacity of an overseer of the
reform process, ensuring that the implementation of SBM is progressing according to the
guidelines set forth in the regulations. The School Review and Improvement Team is
comprised of Department of Education personnel from the Divisions of Student Services
and Finance.  Each school in an Abbott district is assigned to a team that is based at one
of the State's Program Improvement and Regional Centers.  The SRI Teams have a wide
range of responsibilities to include working with the districts and building principal to
ensure the effective implementation of whole school reform and school-based
management; consulting with the school management teams to ensure that all of the SMT
responsibilities are effectively fulfilled; serving as liaisons between the schools and the
Whole School Reform model developers, and consulting with the Superintendents on the
transfer or removal of teachers and principals.
There are two related issues that one may surface regarding the balance in power between
the State and the local sites in the reform process.  First, according to David (1989), a
policy cornerstone of successful decentralization involves the accompanying of local
autonomy with simultaneous relief from onerous rules and regulations (See also Herman
& Herman, 1992, Hill & Bonan, 1991).  The extensive regulatory role played by the
School Review and Improvement Team in the decentralization process in New Jersey
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seems to stand in contradistinction to David's observation. In fact, the question can be
posed as to whether or not the regulations governing the role of the SRI teams have the
potential to undermine local autonomy and thereby result in an intensification of power at
the State level, rather than a real gain of power at the school level?  The strong regulatory
presence of the Department of Education through the School Review and Improvement
Teams far exceeds and is different from the decentralization and centralization tendencies
that many state reform strategies have exhibited (Boyd, 1992;  Levacic, 1995; Levin,
1997).
These strategies evident in other reform efforts have combined shifts in authority to local
schools with state control over setting and monitoring standards. However, the School
Review and Improvement Teams' roles extend beyond one that is primarily of a
monitoring nature.   The SRI among other responsibilities approves decisions made by
the local schools, decides when a team can assume new responsibilities in the areas of
budgeting and personnel (if teams decide by a majority vote to assume these
responsibilities) and approves transfers or firing of principals and teachers.  In effect they
have assumed an external governance role thereby adding another bureaucratic layer to
the reform. One may argue that the SRI structure, which the Department of Education has
put in place to provide field-based assistance to the schools and their respective
management teams, virtually places the Department of Education in the position of
assuming responsibility for the success of the reforms.   Thus, the NJDOE may not be
able to distance itself from any failed policies associated with the reforms.
This broad notion of shared responsibility that is being advocated here implies that state,
local districts, and schools are equally contributing to the successful implementation of
the reforms.  Since the SRI is the primary state resource that is being directed to support
the schools, the question as to how effective this field assistance has been is relevant to
raise.  The School Management Teams in the study were asked to indicate their degree of
satisfaction with the support provided by the SRI teams in the areas stipulated by the
regulations.  The following discussion presents the Teams responses. At the time of the
survey more than one third of the teams had not yet had a meeting with their SRI
facilitator.  Furthermore, several of the teams were unfamiliar with the roles and
responsibilities of the SRI and sought clarification from the researchers.  Thus only 41 of
the 72 teams were able to provide feedback on the SRI teams.   Among the districts
providing feedback, there was a high level of dissatisfaction with the support that the SRI
teams have provided.  Seventy- one percent of the school management teams reported
that their SRI facilitator attended meetings irregularly, and 56% noted that the technical
assistance provided was unsatisfactory. 
While, about 56% of the school management teams stated that their SRI provided
assistance with general implementation issues, 54% noted that the SRI teams provided no
assistance with the actual development of their implementation plans. Furthermore, more
that 58% of the teams were dissatisfied with the help received from their SRI Teams with
problems encountered during implementation; and an even larger percent 68% indicated
that their SRI team provided minimal assistance in working with the model developers. 
An equally substantial number of the teams (25 or 68%) noted that their SRI did not help
in identifying areas for training, neither were the SRI facilitators helpful in assisting them
in the identification of experts that can help with the problem of student achievement. 
With respect to the budgeting process, more than 61% of the school management teams
reported that they were dissatisfied (or unsure of how satisfied they were) with the
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assistance, which their SRI facilitator provided in the development of the school budgets. 
Overall, only about 38% of the teams reported general satisfaction with the support,
which they have received from the SRI Team that has been assigned to them.
When cohort status is entered as the main effect in several one-way ANOVAS in which
evaluations of the SRI various responsibilities are treated as the dependent measures,
several significant findings were found.  According to the data furnished in Table 5, the
impact of cohort status on the teams' evaluation of the SRIs was significant in six areas.  
(See Table 6) These were: help in implementation, providing satisfactory technical
assistance, providing assistance with the school's implementation plan, helping with the
model developers of the various whole school reform models, providing assistance in
school-based budgeting and overall support.    Results of the Tukey post hoc testing
reveals that schools belonging to the first cohort were significantly more dissatisfied with
the support, which they received from their SRI facilitators than Cohort 2 Teams.  As was
noted earlier, Cohort 1 school management teams began their school reform process
within a year of the Court's decision.  Moreover, these teams had minimal time to engage
in quality planning.
Table 5
Percent of Teams Reporting Satisfaction with their School Review and
Improvement Teams in Key Areas of Support
                                                                                                                                               
Area of Support Percent Reporting 
Satisfaction
Assistance with implementation 56%
Review of the school's budget  50%
Support with resolving problems 42%
Assistance with implementation plan 41%
Assistance with the development of the school's budget 39%
Technical Assistance 36%
Attendance at meetings 29%
Support with the Model Developers 26%
Identifying for the schools, experts who can help with 
student achievement
18%
Identifying areas for training 15%
Overall Satisfaction with the SRI Teams 38%
Number of teams responding: 37
Table 6
ANOVA Results for the Main Effect of Cohort Status
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Dependent Variables Df(B)/
Df(W)
MS(B)/
MS(W)
F
SRI Team 
attends meetings.    
2
35
6.982
2.329 2.996
SRI has
helped in
implementation.
2
33
6.775
1.915
3.538*
Technical
assistance
is satisfactory.
2
33
8.997
1.956
4.599**
SRI has
provided
assistance with
implementation plan.
2
33
7.589
2.115
3.521*
SRI has
helped
in problem
solving.
2
30
5.699
1.917
2.973
SRI has
helped with
the Model
Developers.
2
32
6.444
1.806
3.568*
SRI has
helped to
identify areas
for training.
2
32
3.721
1.353
2.750
SRI has
identified
experts that can
help with student
achievement.  
2
32
3.643
1.581
2.304
Team is satisfied
with assistance
from SRI in
school-based budgeting
2
32
10.836
1.966
5.513**
Satisfied with
Overall support
from the SRI
2
33
7.687
2.046
3.757*
Post Hoc testing based on TUKEY; *p< .05; **p<. 001
Information provided during the focus group session suggests that two factors were
contributing to the ineffectiveness of the SRI teams.  The first, relates to the instability of
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team members.  All of the districts in the focus group concurred that during the early
phases of the reform there was a high turnover of individuals on the SRI teams. A second
contributing factor identified by the districts is the knowledge base and experiences
brought by the SRI facilitators.  There was general agreement that the SRI facilitators
lacked the experiences and knowledge base around the change process in general and
reform within the urban context in particular.  SRI team facilitators were described as
being inexperienced and who for the most part seemed to be learning from the districts
and schools rather than the other way around.    These findings on the relative
ineffectiveness of the SRI teams are not new.  An earlier study on factors impacting on
the implementation of the reforms pointed to problems with the SRI teams and had
suggested that the State Department of Education needed to closely evaluate the way in
which these teams were functioning (Walker & Gutmore, 2000).   The overall impact of
the SRI teams' ineffectiveness is evident in the fact that slightly more that 48% of the
school based management teams noted that the absence of technical support has posed a
challenge to their ability to function.
Understanding the Process of Devolving Authority
The focus group discussions with central office personnel knowledgeable about the
devolving of authority to the school management teams as well as discussions with
school superintendents provide additional insights into the myriad of issues the districts
are facing as the shifts in the distribution of power and authority occur. All the districts in
the focus group prior to the Abbott rulings had begun to create opportunities for
participatory decision- making in their systems.  In some instances, these opportunities
were more formally structured with the establishment of what is defined as school core
teams.  Thus, districts did not express aversion to devolving authority to the local sites
and indeed endorsed the process as a means of creating structures that were more
inclusive of the voices of their various constituents.  However, the districts did provide
comments on what were perceived to be salient issues that adversely affecting the
effective implementation of SBM.
First, there was unanimity among the districts that the vagueness and lack of specificity in
the state's regulations led to confusion and misinterpretations on the part of the school
management teams as to their roles and responsibilities. This they pointed out was further
exacerbated by the ongoing changes to the guidelines that occurred annually. A second
related concern dealt with the issues of competing power and authority in the areas of
school operations and curriculum.  Prior to the most current form of the regulations there
were no statements by the DOE clarifying the overall roles and responsibilities of the
building principal.  This resulted in the school management teams erroneously assuming
that they were responsible for operational issues within their local schools.  A
compounding factor contributing to the position of the principal vis-a- vis the teams was
the leadership skills of some principals. District representatives noted that in schools led
by weak principals, the school management teams emerged as centers of power.
Respondents cited examples of situations in which these principals had abdicated their
responsibilities to the Teams, and in so doing were sometimes unaware of critical
decisions made by the teams. 
The importance of properly clarifying the role of the principal in decentralized structures
has been underscored in some of the literature.  According to Meadows (1990) one of the
essential problems with some forms of school-based management is that the group makes
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the decision but the leader or principal alone is accountable.   Research has demonstrated
that principal leadership plays an important role in the successful devolution of authority.
For example, Leithwood et.al (1999) found that principal leadership is quite central to
teams that have the greatest influence on school practices.  According to the Leithwood
study, the principal's role is both symbolic and instrumental.   Leithwood noted that
school-based management tended to have a greater impact in schools in which principals
facilitated the development of the teams, helped to focus the teams' activities on
educationally substantive issues and engaged in a shared or distributive leadership role
with the teams, than in schools in which the reverse was true. 
The second area of contestation occurred over matters of curriculum. In this arena, central
office curriculum staff was pitted against the school management teams.  According to
the regulations, the school management teams have considerable responsibilities for
ensuring that the curriculum in their buildings as well as instruction is aligned to the core
content standards.  However as the districts noted, these curricular issues were previously
resolved at the central office level in response to the state's adoption of the Core
Curriculum Content Standards (which predated the most recent Abbott rulings). 
However, there was uncertainty among the teams about the relationship between the
enacted curriculum based upon the district's aligned curricular frameworks on the one
hand, and their responsibility for curriculum in their schools on the other.  The confusion
experienced by the teams with regards to their roles and responsibilities for curricular and
instructional matters was perceived to be further compounded by the inability of the SRI
teams to provide clear directions and meaningful guidance to the resolution of these
issues.   
As discussed earlier concerns about the effectiveness of the School Review and
Improvement Teams have been expressed by not only the teams, but central office
personnel and superintendents as well.  Apart from the many issues that were previously
mentioned, one extremely problematic area for the districts, which surfaced in the
interviews with the superintendents, is the SRIs review of transfers.  The guidelines state
that any request for transfers must have the approval of the SRI teams. Superintendents
complained that this process has not worked efficiently, and that the slow response of the
SRI teams has created bottlenecks within their organizations.
Yet in spite of these difficulties, all the districts concurred that their school management
teams have demonstrated commitment and diligence in their efforts to develop quality
implementation plans.  Most of the districts indicated that their local teachers unions have
been instrumental in helping the reform process.  However, as the districts observed, the
rushed timetables for decision-making, the inconsistencies and poor guidelines emanating
from the DOE and the ineffectual role of the School Review and Improvement Teams
have all served to undermine the successful devolution of authority to the local school
sites.
Discussion and Conclusions
The findings in this study raise a number of policy concerns regarding how authority gets
devolved from central to local structures. The first is the apparent tension between policy
statements developed by state elites and the environments, which they seek to influence.
The regulations regarding membership composition created two sets of problems for the
schools. First, the regulations made it clear, that no community member employed by a
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school district could serve on a school management team in the capacity of either a parent
or community representative.  However, in districts, in which the public education sector
tends to play a significant role in the employment of local residents, this regulation meant
that a substantial section of the community would be excluded from serving on these
teams.  Second, the regulations stipulated that no one group of stakeholder could
constitute a majority on the teams. However, if schools are precluded from recruiting
memberships from significant pockets within their communities, then the goal of
attaining balanced representation is difficult to attain.  Indeed, the study found, that in
effect, among the teams studied, there was regression towards a teacher-dominated form
of school-based management. The preclusion of important “community voices” on these
teams resulted in less than favorable outcomes.  As noted, teams without adequate
community representation were less likely to explore alternatives before arriving at
decisions, and more prone to the intrusion of narrow individual interests over group goal. 
In democratic situations, broad based participation allows for the expression of different
viewpoints thus increasing the likelihood of informed decisions being made.
Policies that do not have as an important corollary, the building of capacity among local
actors are likely to encounter difficulties during implementation.  Moving from
centralized to decentralized structures   imply that at some point during the process, those
to whom power is being devolved, will develop the necessary prerequisite skills that will
allow them to effectively develop and execute decisions.  The present study found, that
teams lacked the experience, knowledge, and skills, and were not provided with adequate
training that would have allowed them to make effective decisions.  Furthermore, in the
case of the first cohort of schools, the strict timelines imposed by the state on these
schools to arrive at important decisions regarding their schools instructional
programming resulted in decisions that were authoritatively rather than democratically
made. In some cases, these schools' implementation plans were summarily rejected by
State elites (Walker, 2001; Walker & Gutmore, 2000).
More importantly, when authority is being shifted or redistributed among various power
sites, it is important that the spheres of responsibility be thoroughly clarified. In the New
Jersey case, no clear delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the teams, building
principals, central offices, and local school boards were made.  This led to contestation
over areas of responsibilities. In addition to clarifying roles, questions as to how the time
of teams can be constructively and efficiently used to bring about educational
improvement in their communities ought to be fully explored. When teams lack the
capacity to effectively govern, and when there is contestation over spheres of influence
circumscribing the boundaries of each group's responsibilities is necessary.   In the case
of the current study, it is felt that the roles and responsibilities of the school management
teams ought to be more circumscribed by state policy.  The regulations give the teams a
broad set of responsibilities that cover most of the processes inhering in teaching and
learning as well as the management of their schools.  However, as was seen, not only do
the teams lack the knowledge and experience to fulfill some of these tasks, but neither are
they comfortable in carrying out some of these functions.  Further, the rushed timetables
for making decisions have made it impossible for the teams to engage in quality
planning. 
When policies that seek to promote increased school responsibility for decision-making
include as a precondition the ability of state elites to approve or disapprove decisions that
are made by democratically constituted teams, these policies in effect undermine the very
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principles on which the concept of decentralization is premised. As was seen in the case
of New Jersey, in reality what has occurred is an intensification and consolidation of
power at the state level.  In this case, the school systems do not enjoy genuine autonomy,
and in reality have only limited discretion over the reforms. Thus, decentralization in the
Abbott districts has come to function as Ball describes it as a ‘ mechanism for delivering
reform rather than a vehicle for institutional initiative and innovation' (Ball, 1993:76).  
Clearly, a deconstruction of decentralization within the New Jersey context, unmasks the
apparent contradictions in the policy governing whole school reform through
participatory decision- making.  This is borne out not only by the data provided in this
study, but the continuous challenges that have been made to the manner in which the
Department of Education has reacted to decisions made at the local site (See Walker &
Gutmore, 2000).
Ball (1993) and Smyth (1993) have both suggested that state elites and other interest
groups may push for decentralization motivated more by protecting their self-interests
than any deep-seated belief in social democratic principles.  In such instances,
communities unwittingly grant these groups legitimacy.  By assuming responsibility for
implementing poor policies, parents, teachers and the community buffer state elites from
any adverse consequences caused by such policies.  State elites are thus able to avoid
their social responsibilities under the guise of decentralization. Moreover, as Miron
(1996) suggests, one of the unanticipated outcomes of decentralization, is the
reinforcement of calls by economic elites for market-based solutions to the problem of
urban education.  Thus, with the failure of decentralization the case for privatizing public
education can be more forcibly made.  The issues, which have surfaced in this paper if
not addressed substantively at the policy-making level, do not augur favorably for
empowering local communities to assist in rebuilding their educational institutions.
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